Tanglewood Case 4 Essays

Tanglewood Case 4 Essays Tanglewood Case 4 Paper Tanglewood Case 4 Paper 1. Tanglewood currently uses traditional predictors such as work experience, education and interview, to predict whether a candidate has the characteristics to excel in the areas of citizenship, absence, performance and promotion. These predictors are proven to predict a future employee’s promotion potential. However, only work experience can also predict performance, the rest of the selection tools do not statistically predict citizenship, absence or performance. The worst statistical predictor of performance, in the traditional method, has proven to be the interview score with a high p-value and a very low correlation. 2. Tanglewood would like to more accurately predict the characteristic of future employees who will excel in citizenship and absence. We have been experimenting with different predictors, with some success, in the Seattle area, for the last year. The best predictors of these characteristics have proven statistically to be the Marshfield customer service biodata questionnaire essay, with a correlation of . 22 and a p-value of . 01 for citizenship and a correlation of -. 17 and a p-value of . 1, and the personality exam which measures extraversion and conscientiousness focusing on the conscientiousness with a correlation of . 18 and p-value of . 01 for citizenship and a correlation of -. 33 and a p-value of . 01 for absence. However, in my opinion the biodata questionnaire is not a practical tool due the cost and the fact potential employees may find the essay questions difficult to answer with possible lengthy answers and the questions responded to using the 5-point scale many applic ants may feel the answers require further clarification than the 5-point scale. Another problem with biodata as a predictor is the questions are asking for life experiences which many of the applicants may not have yet experience due to their age and other limitations. The biggest difference in the two samples, traditional and the proposed method, regarding correlations is the size of the samples which changes the correlation significance. The reason for the difference in the sample size, of the proposed method, is it was used as a trial base, at only selected stores and carefully administered whereas the traditional method information was gathered informally. Job Analysis: Store Associate Performance dimensions and tasks statements: Greet customers and ascertain what each customer wants. Maintain knowledge of current sales and promotions. Provide recommendations or locate merchandise for customers. Answer questions regarding the store and its merchandise. Describe merchandise and its operation and care to customers. Continually monitor for and resolve security and theft problem. Ticket arrange and display merchandise to promote sales. KSAOs Knowledge of customer service principles. Knowledge of merchandise offered in the stores Communication and speaking skills Ability to relate to others Skill in organizing, combining, and documenting information Ability to perform light lifting and object manipulation Predictor Measures Content validity is used to estimate how the methods are actually measuring the desired characteristics. Tanglewood has an interest in improving citizenship and absence. According to the observation above, the most effective measure of these characteristics biodata and conscientiousness. Content validation is most appropriate when the sample size is few and criterion measures are not available. 3. In order for Tanglewood to find good employment candidate it should look to the predictors and choose the ones that predict the characteristic most important to the company. Accordingly, they should continue to rely on the application blank to obtain information on education and work experience which accurately predicts performance and promotion potential. The managers have already expressed an interest in retaining the interview as a predictor this is possible however the interview should be standardized to a structured interview with open ended questions to invite the applicant to provide the information needed. This standardization will allow for applicants answers to be compared. Another good predictor for Tanglewood to administer is the conscientiousness part of the personality test which has proven to be an accurate predictor of citizenship and absence. These characteristic are very important to maintain the desired culture at Tanglewood. They could also consider using biodata which is a very good predictor of all identified characteristics however the applicant may find this a difficult test due to the expectation of the applicant describing life experiences which they may not have experienced due to their age or lack of life experiences. 4. Tanglewood should have success with the proposed validation procedures. Use of the application blank is very common and widely excepted practice. The changes to the interview, standardization and open ended questions, will allow for comparisons among the applicants. The conscientious test should, also, be easily accepted. The biodata test may possibly prove difficult to administer in the more rural areas due to the expectation of applicant to describe life experiences and situations the do not apply or have not been experienced. However, these proposed validation procedures should yield more qualified applicants better than the traditional predictors and allow Tanglewood to obtain more employees with the characteristic sought by the company.

Habits and Traits of the Common Cellar Spider

Habits and Traits of the Common Cellar Spider People often refer to cellar spiders (Family Pholcidae) as daddy longlegs, because most do have long, slender legs. This can create some confusion, however, because daddy longlegs is also used as a nickname for harvestman, and sometimes even for craneflies. Description If you havent guessed already, pholcid spiders often take up residence in basements, sheds, garages, and other similar structures. They construct irregular, stringy webs (another way to differentiate them from harvestman, which doesnt produce silk). Most (but not all) cellar spiders have legs that are disproportionately long for their bodies. The species with shorter legs typically live in leaf litter, and not your basement. They have flexible tarsi. Most (but again, not all) pholcid species have eight eyes; some species have just six. Cellar spiders are usually dull in color, and less than 0.5 inches in body length. The largest known pholcid species in the world, Artema atlanta, is only 11 mm (0.43 mm) long. This species was introduced to North America, and now inhabits a small area of Arizona and California. The long-bodied cellar spider, Pholcus phalangioides, is a very common find in basements throughout the world. Classification Kingdom – AnimaliaPhylum – ArthropodaClass – ArachnidaOrder – AraneaeInfraorder - AraneomorphaeFamily - Pholcidae Diet Cellar spiders prey on insects and other spiders and are particularly fond of eating ants. They are highly sensitive to vibrations and will close in on an unsuspecting arthropod rapidly if it happens to wander into its web. Cellar spiders have also been observed purposely vibrating the webs of other spiders, as a tricky way of luring in a meal. Life Cycle Female cellar spiders wrap their eggs loosely in silk to form a rather flimsy but effective egg sac. The mother pholcid carries the egg sac in her jaws. Like all spiders, the young spiderlings hatch from their eggs looking similar to adults. They molt their skin as they grow into adults. Special Adaptations and Defenses When they feel threatened, cellar spiders will vibrate their webs rapidly, presumably to confuse or deter the predator. Its unclear whether this makes the pholcid more difficult to see or catch, but its a strategy that seems to work for the cellar spider. Some people refer to them as vibrating spiders because of this habit. Cellar spiders are also quick to autotomize (shed) legs to escape predators. Although cellar spiders do have venom, they arent a cause for concern. A common myth about them is that they are highly venomous, but lack fangs long enough to penetrate human skin. This is a total fabrication. Its even been debunked on Mythbusters. Range and Distribution Worldwide, there are nearly 900 species of cellar spiders, with most living in the tropics. Just 34 species live in North America (north of Mexico), and some of these were introduced. Cellar spiders are most often associated with human dwellings, but also inhabit caves, leaf litter, rock piles, and other protected natural environments.

Language learning assignment Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

Language learning assignment - Essay Example Moreover, it is a reservoir of knowledge of various disciplines like communications, science, business, aviation, entertainment, and diplomacy and also on the Internet. Most of the developments in specialised fields in the developed countries require the usage of English. The advent of Internet and information technology has further emphasised the importance of English as an international language. In this globalised era, the progress and development of a country, to a large extent, is associated with the usage of the English language. After the Second World War, British idealism spread in many parts of the globe and with the United Kingdom becoming highly developed, the language spoken by most European countries, i.e., English became very popular. Thus, over a period of time English has developed into a prominent language. Because of these reasons, the teaching of English, especially in non-English speaking countries has assumed special significance. With the expansion of commerce a nd industry, and the advances in technology, geographical distance has become irrelevant and the world has shrunk into a global village. With the opening up of bigger markets, many new job opportunities became available for aspirants in various fields all over the world. So there is such an unprecedented movement of skilled labourers across the globe and most of them seek Europe and USA as their hopeful destinations. The primary requisite for employment is a working knowledge of English. The requirement and proficiency will vary according to the nature of the job. The burgeoning job opportunities in various fields necessitated the aspirants to master the English language. In the filed of education also English is accepted as the most preferred mediums of instruction and interaction between teacher and pupils. Therefore, proficiency in English language has become a primary necessity. Hence to measure the proficiency of language called for certain criteria. Because of these

Social Diversity -teaching across different learning styles Essay

Social Diversity -teaching across different learning styles - Essay Example In addition he further talked about the cognitive, moral and social development in children. As far as cognitive and socio moral development is concerned, Piaget relates three parallels. First, Piaget explained that as the object world is constructed by child, same case occurs with psychological development. So, psychological knowledge can be constructed by child as well. According to Piaget, second parallel involves the fact that affect is an in- dissociable element while talking about intellectual growth and development process. So, socio affective ties motivate moral and social development. Third, self regulation process is also described for moral and social development as for Intellectual and cognitive process. In the view of Jean Piaget, child’s intellectual development and adaption are always dependent on environment. This occurs in the same way as physical development does happen. While talking about development, Piaget also mentions and focuses the significance of pee r relations same as Tudge and Rogoff mentioned in ‘Interaction in human development’ (1989). However, according to Piaget’s view, peer relations do matter a lot as far as child’s construction and development process are related. ... So, Piaget’s development process expressed a gradual movement in children from anomy to heteronomy which further leads to autonomy. This description can further be described as a process when child passes through development process from non regulation by self and others to a process when child starts getting directives by others. Finally, a child reaches to a stage of autonomy meaning self regulation process. Moreover, Piaget also mentions two types of moral development in children based on their relations with adults. The positive regulations lead in the promotion of development optimistically. On the other hand, negative directions or coercion retard the overall development in short and long run as well. So, we can see that morality is not dependent on personal or individual convictions rather it always depends on environment and people with which a child interacts. Here, it is also important to mention that although child development is based on people living around but it is also a fact that believes also play a major role in this regard. This is also known as autonomous morality. This morality reflects the process of self regulation in children. Self constructed moral values give rise to beliefs. Moreover on practical level, we can see beliefs really play a great role as far as development process is related. Children will never like to follow readymade rules given or prescribed by their adults until or unless they develop personal convictions in this regard. So, when we talk about education instruction, cultural diversity, language and learning, we can see that adult child relationships do matter a lot. These relations might be power based where adults always

Business Task 1 on individual report Essay Example for Free

Business Task 1 on individual report Essay Despite its future economic prospects, the United Arab Emirates continues to suffer from corporate governance issues. The development of corporate governance in the region has largely been influenced by religion (Gellis et al., 2002). The rules governing the practice of corporate governance have been significantly influenced by Islamic Sharia. This reflects the cultural and religious characteristic of the region (Islam and Hussain, 2003). Islamic Sharia specifies a number of core values such as trust, integrity, honesty and justice which are similar to the core values of corporate governance codes in the West. However, a survey of corporate governance in a number of Gulf countries such as United Arab Emirates suggests that the region continues to suffer from corporate governance weaknesses. 2.0 Reasons for the structure including use of suitable evidence and data                  The structure of the above sectors and reasons for the structure and effects on the performance of firms has been vital subject of debate in the finance literature. Empirical evidence suggests that privately held firms tend to be more efficient and more profitable than publicly held firms. This shows that ownership structure matters. The question now is how does it affect firm performance and why this kind of structure? This question is significant since it is based on a research agenda that has been strongly promoted by La Porta et al.                  According to these studies, failure of the legislative framework to provide sufficient protection for external investors, entrepreneurs and founding investors of a company tend will maintain large positions in their firms thus resulting in a concentrated ownership structure. This finding is interesting because it implies that ownership structure can affect the performance of the firm in one way or the other. It is indisputable; the lack of regulations in corporate governance gives managers who intend to mishandle the flow of cash for their own personal interest a low control level. The empirical results from the past studies of impacts of ownership structure on performance of corporate have been inconclusive and mixed up.               In response to corporate governance issues and their impact on corporate performance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997); and Jensen (2000) have suggested the need for improved corporate governance structures so as to enhance transparency, accountability and responsibility.                  Corporate governance reform and the introduction of innovative methods to limit abuse of power by top management have been justified by recent large scale accounting and corporate failures such as Enron, HealthSouth, Tyco International, Adelphia, Global Crossing, WorldCom, Cendant and the recent global financial crisis.                   According to Monks and Minow (1996) numerous corporate failures suggest that existing corporate governance structures are not working effectively. Corporate failures and accounting scandals initially appear to a U.S phenomenon, resulting from excessive greed by investors, overheated equity markets, and a winner-take-all mind-set of the U.S society. However, the last decade has shown that irregularities in accounting, managerial greed, abuse of power, are global phenomenon that cannot be limited to the U.S. Many non-U.S firms such as Parallax, Adecco, TV Azteca, Hollinger, Royal Dutch Shell, Vivendi, China Aviation, Barings Bank, etc. have witnessed failures in corporate governance and other forms of corporate mishaps.            In addition to corporate governance failures, global standards have declined significantly and unethical and questionable practices have become widely accepted. The net impact has been a reduction in the amount of faith that investors and shareholders have in the efficiency of capital markets. There is no universally accepted corporate governance model that the interest of shareholders and investors are adequately protected as well as ensuring that enough shareholder wealth is being created (Donaldson and Davis, 2001; Huse, 1995; Frentrop, 2003).               Much of the debate on corporate governance has focused on understanding whether the Board of Directors has enough power to ensure that top management is making the right decision. The traditional corporate governance framework often ignores the unique effect that the owners of the firm can have on the board and thus the firm’s top management. The traditional framework therefore ignores that fact that the owners of the firm can influence the board and thus top management to act of make particular decisions. Corporate governance studies are therefore yet to identify and deal with the complexities that are inherent in corporate governance processes.             Investment choices and owner preferences are affected among other things by the extent their degree of risk aversion. Owners who have economic relations with the firm will be interested in protecting their interests even if it is reasonably evident that such protection will result in poor performance. According to Thomsen and Pedersen (1997) banks that play a dual role as owners and lenders would discourage high risk projects with great profit potential because such projects may hinder the firm from meeting its financial obligations if the project fails to realize its expected cash flows. The government also plays a dual role in that it serves as both an owner and a regulator. Therefore owners who play a dual role in the firm often face a trade-off between promoting the creation of shareholder value and meeting their other specific objectives (Hill and Jones, 1992).                  Existing corporate governance frameworks have often ignored these issues in UAE. Rather, much of the emphasis has been on the effectiveness of the board in ensuring that top management is working towards meeting the goals of shareholders. Present corporate governance frameworks lack the ability to monitor owners and their influence on top management. The framework lacks the ability to align the role played by firm owners, board of directors and managers’ interests and actions with the creation of shareholder value and welfare motivation of stakeholders. Discussion of the possible future structure of the industry                     The United Arabs Emirates, and mainly Abu Dhabi, is enduring to increase its economy by reducing the total proportion impact of hydrocarbons to Gross Domestic Product. This is currently being done by growing investment in sector areas like: services in telecommunication, education, media, healthcare, tourism, aviation, metals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, transportation and trade.                   Significant investments have been made by United Arab Emirates to establish itself as a regional trade hub. United Arab Emirates is also member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, there are ongoing negotiations to establish free trade agreements with other regions and countries such as the EU. These factors will contribute positively to the regions integration into the global economy. United Arab Emirates is currently working towards diversifying their economies from the oil sector into other sectors. This diversification is expected not only to increase trade among member countries but also to increase the regions trade with other countries and regions (Sturm et al., 2008). How the structure affects strategy decisions                     Ownership structure has an impact on firm performance in United Arab Emirates energy production owned sector. This region has witnessed significant economic growth over the last few decades. The region is also facing turbulent times with respect to corporate governance practices, resulting in poor firm performance. Corporate governance issues are not limited to the United Arabs Emirates as part of GCC Countries. From a global point of view, corporate governance has witnessed significant transformations over the last decade (Gomez and Korine, 2005). As a result, there has been an interest in the research attention accorded to corporate governance. The credibility of current corporate governance structures has come under scrutiny owing to recent corporate failures and low corporate performance across the world.                   The risk aversion of the firm can be directly affected by the ownership structure in place. Agency problems occur as a result of divergence in interests between principals (owners) and agents (managers) (Leech and Leahy, 1991). The board of directors is thereby regarded as an intermediary between managers and owners. The board of directors plays four important roles in the firm. These include monitoring, stewardship, monitoring and reporting. The board of directors monitors and controls the discretion of top management. The board of directors influences managerial discretion in two ways: internal influences which are imposed by the board and external influences which relate to the role played by the market in monitoring and sanctioning managers.                                       B: Contribution of the sector to the economy of your chosen country                         Analysis of contribution of sector                  United Arab Emirates remain major global economic player because it has the highest oil reserves. UAE together with the other Gulf Cooperation Council accounts for over 40% of global oil reserves and remains important in supplying the global economy with oil in future. As a result, investment spending on oil exploration and development of new oil fields is on the rise.                   Global oil demand is currently on the rise. This growth is driven mainly by emerging market economies, as well as the oil producing UAE as part of GCC countries. In addition, Europe and the U.S are witnessing depletions in their oil reserves. This means that these regions will become increasingly dependent on the Gulf region which includes UAE for the supply of oil (Sturm et al., 2008). The importance of the United Arabs Emirates as a global economic player is therefore expected to increase dramatically in the near future Use of appropriate data and other evidence                By the year 2011, the GDP of United Arab Emirates totaled to 360.2 billion dollars. Subsequently in 2001, yearly growth of GNP varied from about 7.4% to 30.7%. As part of the chief crude oil suppliers, the United Arab Emirates was at first cut off from the universal recession by high prices on oil that rose to a record 147 US dollars per barrel in the month of July in 2008. Nevertheless, the nation was ultimately influenced by the excavating worldwide recession which resulted to a decline in oil demand, reducing the oil prices to a reduced amount not exceeding a third of the peak of July 2008. In the last 2008 months, the trembles rumbling through global economies were lastly experienced in this section. Oil (million barrels) Proved reserves, 2013 Total oil supply (thousand bbl/d), 2012 Total petroleum consumption, 2012 Reserves-to-production ratio 97,800 3,213 618 95 Natural Gas (billion cubic feet) Proved reserves, 2013 Dry natural gas production, 2012 Dry natural gas consumption, 2012 Reserves-to-production ratio 215,025 1,854 2,235 116 UAE summary energy statistics C: Critical appraisal of sustainability targets on business plan of your chosen organisation                   Oil firms in United Arab Emirates is still quite immature. Most businesses are controlled by a few shareholders and family ownership is prevalent. Most large and small businesses are family businesses (Saidi, 2004). The state is also significantly involved in the management of companies (Union of Arab Banks, 2003).                     This is contrary to the status quo in Western democracies where firms are owned by a diverse group of shareholders which makes ownership to be completely separated from control. The ownership structure in United Arab Emirates suggests that stewardship and monitoring aspects of non-executive directors (NEDs) is absent in firms based in United Arab Emirates. Ownership concentration has remained high in the region because of practices such as rights issues which enable existing wealthy shareholders, and influential families to subscribe to new shares in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) (Musa, 2002).                   According to a study of the corporate governance practices of five countries by the Union of Arab Banks (2003), ownership of corporations is concentrated in the hands of families. In addition, corporate boards are dominated by controlling shareholders, their relatives and friends (Union of Arab Banks, 2003). There is a no clear separation between control and ownership. Decision making is dominated by shareholders. The number of independent directors in the board is very small and the functions of the CEO and Chairman are carried out by the same person. The high concentration in firm ownership therefore undermines the principles of good corporate governance that are prevalent in western settings (Yasin and Shehab, 2004). This evidence is consistent with findings by the World Bank (2003) in an investigation of corporate governance practices in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region which also includes the Gulf region. 1.0 Objective of empirical evidence                   The empirical evidence on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance is mixed. Different studies have made use of different samples to arrive at different, contradictory and sometimes difficult to compare conclusions. The literature suggests that there are two main ownership structures in firm including dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership. With respect to concentrated ownership, most of the empirical evidence suggests that concentrated ownership negatively affects performance (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000; Gugler and Weigand, 2003; Grosfeld, 2006; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Different studies have also focused on how specifically concentrated ownership structures affect firm performance. For example, with respect to government ownership, Jefferson (1998), Stiglitz (1996), and Sun et al. (2002) provide theoretical arguments that government ownership is likely to positively affect firm performance because government ownership can facil itate the resolution of issues regarding the ambiguous property rights.                   However, Xu and Wang (1999) and Sun and Tong (2003) provide empirical evidence that government ownership has a negative impact on firm performance. On the contrary, Sun et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence that government ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. It has also been argued that the relationship between government ownership and firm performance is non-linear. Another commonly investigated ownership type and its impact on firm performance is family ownership. Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villanonga and Amit (2006), Maury (2006), Barontini and Caprio (2006), and Pindado et al. (2008) suggest that there is a positive link between family ownership and firm performance. Despite the positive impact some studies argue that the impact of family ownership is negative (e.g. DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; Schulze et al., 2001; Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).                     The impact of foreign ownership has also been investigated. Most of the evidence suggests that foreign ownership has a positive impact on firm performance (e.g., Arnold and Javorcik, 2005; Petkova, 2008; Girma, 2005; Girma and Georg, 2006; Girma et al., 2007; Chari et al., 2011; Mattes, 2008).With respect to managerial ownership, it has been argued that the relationship is likely to be positive. Despite this suggestion Demsetz and Lehn (1985) observe a negative relationship between dispersed ownership and firm performance. Institutional ownership has also been found to have a positive impact on firm performance (e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Han and Suk, 1998; Tsai and Gu, 2007). Furthermore, some studies suggest that there is no link between insider ownership and performance.                  Very limited studies have been conducted on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance in GCC countries like UAE. For example, Arouri et al. (2013) provide evidence that bank performance is affected by family ownership, foreign ownership and institutional ownership and that there is no significant impact of government ownership on bank performance. Zeitun and Al-Kawari (2012) observe a significant positive impact of government ownership on firm performance in the Gulf region.                The pervasive endogeneity of ownership has been cited as a potential reason why it is difficult to disentangle the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. In addition, the relation may be a function of the type of firm as well as the period of observation in the life of the firm. This study is motivated by the mixed results obtained in previous studies and the limited number of studies that have focused on UAE as part of GCC countries. The objective of the study is to explore in more details the factors that motivate particular types of ownership structure and the potential impact of ownership structure and firm performance in the Gulf region 2.0 Empirical Evidence                  The empirical evidence will focus on how different ownership structures affect firm performance. Firms are often characterized by concentrated and dispersed ownership. Concentrated ownership is expected to have a positive impact on firm performance owning to the increased monitoring that it provides.                Dispersed ownership has been found to be less frequent than expected. Empirical evidence suggests that most firms are characterized by various forms of ownership concentration. Given this high level of ownership concentration, there has been an increasing concern over the protection of the rights of non-controlling shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000; Gugler and Weigand, 2003). Empirical evidence shows that ownership concentration at best results in poor performance. Concentrated ownership is costly and has the potential of promoting the exploitation of non-controlling shareholders by controlling shareholders (Grosfeld, 2006). Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) argue that concentrated ownership can contribute to poor liquidity, which can in turn negatively affect performance. In addition, high ownership concentration limits the ability of the firm to diversify (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Admati et al., 1994). There are various forms of concentrated ownership such as gov ernment ownership, family ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. In the next section, the literature review will focus on how these separate ownership structures affect firm performance. 2.1.1 Government Ownership                     The impact of government ownership on firm performance has attracted the attention of many researchers because the government accounts for the largest proportion of shares of listed companies in some countries and also because government ownership can be used as an instrument of intervention by the government (Kang and Kim, 2012). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that government ownership can contribute to poor firm performance because Government Owned enterprises often face political pressure for excessive employment. In addition, it is often difficult to monitor managers of government owned enterprises and there is often a lack of interest in carrying out business process reengineering (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Kang and Kim, 2012). Contrary to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) some economists have argued that government ownership can improve firm performance in less developed and emerging economies in particular. This is because government ownership c an facilitate the resolution of issues with respect to ambiguous property rights.                   The empirical evidence on the impact of state ownership on firm performance is mixed. For example, Xu and Wang (1999) provide evidence of a negative relationship between state ownership and firm performance based on data for Chinese listed firms over the period 1993-1995. The study, however, fails to find any link between the market-to-book ratio and state ownership (Xu and Wang, 1999). Sun and Tong (2003) employ ownership data from 1994 to 2000 and compares legal person ownership with government ownership. The study provides evidence that government ownership negatively affects firm performance while legal person ownership positively affects firm performance. This conclusion is based on the market-to-book ratio as the measure of firm performance.                   However, using return on sales or gross earnings as the measure of firm performance, the study provides evidence that government ownership has no effect on firm performance. Sun et al. (2002) provide contrary evidence from above. Using data over the period 1994-1997, Sun et al. (2002) provide evidence that both legal person ownership and government ownership had a positive effect on firm performance. They explain their results by suggesting that legal person ownership is another form of government ownership. The above studies treat the relationship between government ownership and firm performance as linear. However it has been argued that the relationship is not linear.                  Huang and Xiao (2012) provide evidence that government ownership has a negative net effect on performance in transition economies. La Porta et al. (2002) provide evidence across 92 countries that government ownership of banks contributes negatively to bank performance. The evidence is consistent with Dinc (2005) and Brown and Dinc (2005) who investigate government ownership banks in the U.S. 2.1.2 Family Ownership                  Family ownership is very common in oil firms in UAE. There is a difference between family ownership and other types of shareholders in that family owners tend to be more interested in the long-term survival of the firm than other types of shareholders(Arosa et al., 2010).. Furthermore, family owners tend to be more concerned about the firms reputation of the firm than other shareholders (Arosa et al., 2010). This is because damage to the firms reputation can also result in damage the familys reputation. Many studies have investigated the relationship between family ownership and firm performance. They provide evidence of a positive relationship between family ownership and firm performance (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006; Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Pindado et al., 2008).                   The positive relationship between family ownership and firm performance can be attributed to a number of factors. For example, Arosa et al. (2010) suggests that family firms long-term goals indicate that this category of firms desire investing over long horizons than other shareholders. In addition, because there is a significant relationship between the wealth of the family and the value of the family firm, family owners tend to have greater incentives to monitor managers (agents) than other shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Furthermore, family owners would be more interested in offering incentives to managers that will make them loyal to the firm.                     In addition, there is a substantial long-term presence of families in family firms with strong intentions to preserve the name of the family. These family members are therefore more likely to forego short-term financial rewards so as to enable future generations take over the business and protect the familys reputation (Wang, 2006). In addition, family ownership has positive economic consequences on the business. There are strong control structures that can motivate family members to communicate effectively with other shareholders and creditors using higher quality financial reporting with the resulting effect being a reduction in the cost of financing the business.                Furthermore, families are interested in the long-term survival of the firm and family, which reduces the opportunistic behavior of family members with regard to the distribution of earnings and allocation of management,.                   Despite the positive impact of family ownership on firm performance, it has been argued that family ownership promotes high ownership concentration, which in turn creates corporate governance problems. In addition, high ownership concentration results in other types of costs. As earlier mentioned, La Porta et al. (1999) and Vollalonga and Amit (2006) argue that controlling shareholders are likely to undertake activities that will give them gain unfair advantage over non-controlling shareholders. For example, family firms may be unwilling to pay dividends .                  Another reason why family ownership can have a negative impact on firm performance is that controlling family shareholders can easily favour their own interests at the expense of non-controlling shareholders by running the company as a family employment service. Under such circumstances, management positions will be limited to family members and extraordinary dividends will be paid to family shareholders. Agency costs may arise because of dividend payments and management entrenchment. Families may also have their own interests and concerns that may not be in line with the concerns and interests of other investor groups.                Schulze et al. (2001) provide a discussion, which suggests that the impact of family ownership on firm performance can be a function of the generation. For example, noting that agency costs often arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control, they argue that first generation family firms tend to have limited agency problems because the management and supervision decisions are made by the same individual. As such agency costs are reduced because the separation of ownership and control has been completely eliminated. Given that there is no separation of ownership and control in the first generation family firm, the firm relationship between family ownership and performance is likely to be positive (Miller and Le-Breton-Miller, 2006). As the firm enters second and third generations, the family property becomes shared by an increasingly large number of family members with diverse interests. The moment conflict of interests sets in the relationship between family ownership and performance turns negative in accordance to. Furthermore, agency problems arise from family relations because family members with control over the firm’s resources are more likely to be generous to their children and other relatives.                To summarize, the relationship between family ownership and firm performance may be non-linear. This means that the relationship is likely to be positive and negative at the same time. To support this contention, a number of studies have observed a non-linear relationship between family ownership and firm performance (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006). This means that when ownership is less concentrated, family ownership is likely to have a positive impact on firm performance. As the family ownership concentration increases, minority shareholders tend to be exploited by family owners and thus the impact of family ownership on firm performance tends negative.                  Small countries have a relatively weak diamond of competitive advantages. D. Analysis 1.0 Potter’s Diamond Model                  The competitive forces advantages or analysis ought to be fixed on the main competition factors and its impact analysis on the business (Porter 1998, p.142). The state, and home wealth cannot be inherited -3554730607695Faktorski uvjeti 00Faktorski uvjeti -27546301293495Vezane i podrÃ… ¾avajuće industrije 00Vezane i podrÃ… ¾avajuće industrije -332041536195Ã…  ansa 00Ã…  ansa – it ought to be produced (Porter 1998, p.155). This wealth is influenced by the ability of industry to continually upgrade and innovate itself, and this is achievable exclusively by increase means in production – in all parts of fiscal action. The model of Porter concerns aspect which circuitously or openly affects advantage of competition. The aspect structure a place where given manufacturing sector like in this case, oil sector, state or region a learn and act on the way of competing in that environment. Left0 -3686175215392000Each diamond (oil) and the field of diamond (oil) as the whole structure consists of main influences that makes the oil sector competition to be successive. These influences entail: every ability and resource vital for competitive advantage of the sector; data forming the opportunity and providing the response to how accessible abilities and resources ought to be ruled; each interest group aim; and the is most crucial, oil sector pressure to innovating and investing. Swot analysis Strengths The oil sector has many years producing oil and so is well established. Comparatively lots of sub-sectors for industrialist stability and support. Weaknesses Comparatively out of date scientific foundation. Inadequate well educated professionals and residents in comparison to the new industry needs. Lesser costs of work cost in oil sector due to low salary from regular salaries in UAE. Opportunities                  The likelihood for resources application of EU agreement funds, as is the state resources Reasonably good quality of 11 % graduate students share that are likely to be absorbed into this oil sector. Contribution in motivational and investment projects that help in developing the economy of UAE every time. Threats Expansion of oil production capacity of economies of South-Eastern that have competed with low prices of products and little costs of production. Loan jobs and production globalisation. Reinforcement of local competition of adjacent economies, and thus reinforcing actions that attract direct overseas exploitation of the oil sector in UAE through investments. References Admati, A., Pfleiderer, P., and Zechner, J. 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Adventures of Huck in Mark Twains The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn :: Adventures Huckleberry Huck Finn Essays

Adventures of Huckleberry Finn The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, is based on a young boy's coming of age in Missouri of the mid-1800s. This story depicts many serious issues that occur on the "dry land of civilization" better known as society. As these somber events following the Civil War are told through the young eyes of Huckleberry Finn, he unknowingly develops morally from both the conforming and non-conforming influences surrounding him on his journey to freedom. Huck's moral evolution begins before he ever sets foot on the raft down the Mississippi. His mother has died, and his father is constantly in a drunken state. Huck grows up following his own rules until he moves in with the Widow Douglas and her sister, Miss Watson. Together, the women attempt to civilize Huck by making him attend school, study religion, and act in a way the women find socially acceptable. However, Huck's free-spirited soul keeps him from joining the constraining and lonely life the two women have in store for him. The freedom Huck seeks in Tom Sawyer's gang is nothing more than romantic child's-play. Raiding a caravan of Arabs really means terrorizing young children on a Sunday school picnic, and the stolen "joolry" is nothing more than turnips or rocks. Huck is disappointed that the adventures Tom promises are not real and so, along with the other members, he resigns from the gang. Still, he ignorantly assumes that Tom is superior to him because of his more suitable family background and fascination with Romantic literature (Twain). Pap and "the kidnapping" play another big role in Huck's moral development. Pap is completely antisocial and wishes to undo all of the civilizing effects that the Widow and Miss Watson have attempted to instill in him. However, Pap does not symbolize freedom; he promotes drunkenness, prejudice, and abuse. Huck escapes the cabin to search for the freedom he yearns for. It is after he escapes to Jackson Island that he meets the most i nfluential character of the novel, Jim. After conversing, Huck learns things about the runaway slave that he had never been aware of. Jim has a family, dreams, and talents such as knowing "all kinds of signs about the future," people's personalities, and weather forecasting (Twain 69).

Abusive Supervisory Reactions to Coworker Relationship Conflict

The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect The Leadership Quarterly j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / l e a q u a Abusive supervisory reactions to coworker relationship con? ict Kenneth J. Harris a,? , Paul Harvey b, K. Michele Kacmar cIndiana University Southeast, School of Business, 4201 Grant Line Road, New Albany, IN 47150, USA Management Department, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire, USA Department of Management and Marketing, Culverhouse College of Commerce and Business Administration, 143 Alston Hall, Box 870225, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487-0225, USA b c a a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t This study extends research on abusive supervision by exploring how supervisor reports of conflict with their coworkers are related to abusive behaviors and resulting outcomes.We utilize research on displaced aggression, conflict, a nd leader–member exchange (LMX) theory to formulate our hypotheses. Results from two samples of 121 and 134 matched supervisor– subordinate dyads support the idea that supervisors experiencing coworker relationship conflict are likely to engage in abusive behaviors directed toward their subordinates and that LMX quality moderates this relationship. Additionally, abusive supervision was associated with decreased work effort and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB).Results also indicate that in both samples abusive supervision mediates the relationships between supervisor reports of coworker relationship conflict and OCB, and in one sample mediates the association between supervisor-reported coworker relationship conflict and work effort.  © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Available online 10 August 2011 Keywords: Abusive supervision Coworker relationship con? ict Multi-level 1. Introduction Abusive supervision, or the prolonged hostile treatment of subor dinates, has been recognized as a signi? ant threat to employee well being and productivity in both the popular press (e. g. , Elmer, 2006) and in organizational research (e. g. , Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002; Harris, Kacmar, & Zivnuska, 2007; Harvey, Stoner, Hochwarter, & Kacmar, 2007; Hoobler & Brass, 2006; Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007; Tepper, 2000, 2007; Tepper, Duffy, & Shaw, 2001; Zellars, Tepper, & Duffy, 2002). Behaviors that fall under the umbrella of abusive supervision, such as sabotaging, yelling at, or ignoring subordinates, have been linked to an array of negative consequences (see Tepper, 2007 for an overview).Research also suggests that these forms of abuse are alarmingly common in modern organizations (Namie & Namie, 2000; Tepper, 2007). The purpose of this study is to develop and test a conceptual model that expands our knowledge of antecedents, moderators, and consequences of abusive supervision. We also build on past research showing that supervisors' relationship c on? icts can â€Å"trickle down† to subordinates in the form of abusive behaviors (Aryee, Chen, Sun, & Debrah, 2007). Speci? cally, we test the notion that supervisors who experience relationship con? ct, de? ned as interpersonal â€Å"tension, animosity, and annoyance† (Jehn, 1995, p. 258), with their coworkers respond by abusing subordinates. The proposed relationship between supervisor-level coworker relationship con? ict and abusive supervision is rooted in the notion of displaced aggression, which occurs when the reaction to an unpleasant outcome or behavior from one source is redirected to a second source (Miller, Pedersen, Earlywine, & Pollock, 2003; Tedeschi & Norman, 1985).Consistent with Tepper (2007), we argue that the relatively weak retaliatory power of subordinates, as compared to coworkers, increases the likelihood that relationship con? ict-driven frustration will be vented at subordinates. We qualify this assumption, however, by arguing that supervisor s who experience coworker relationship con? ict will not behave abusively toward all of their subordinates. We explore ? Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email  protected] edu (K. J. Harris), Paul. [email  protected] edu (P. Harvey), [email  protected] ua. edu (K. M. Kacmar). 1048-9843/$ – see front matter  © 2011 Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved. doi:10. 1016/j. leaqua. 2011. 07. 020 K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 1011 this idea by examining leader–member relationship (LMX) quality as a moderator of the relationship between supervisors' levels of coworker relationship con? ict and abusive supervision. Finally, we advance the extant research by investigating two supervisorrated employee outcomes (work effort, and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB)), one of which has not previously been examined in the context of abusive supervision.These outcomes were chosen as they extend the literature and we were int erested in actual behaviors directed toward the job/task (work effort and task-focused OCB). We examine these relationships, shown in Fig. 1, in two separate samples of matched supervisor–subordinate dyads. Thus, the current study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we examine the in? uence of con? ict between supervisors on subordinate reports of abusive supervision. Examining this relationship is important because although coworker relationship con? cts have negative outcomes, studies have yet to investigate how supervisors experiencing these con? icts treat their subordinates. Second, we investigate LMX quality as a relationship variable that changes how supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict and abusive supervision are related. Third, we extend the nomological network of abusive supervision by examining the outcomes of work effort and OCB. Finally, we investigate the potential for abusive supervision to mediate the associations between supe rvisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict and distal consequences.Thus, this study takes a ? rst step toward explaining how (through the intermediary mechanism of abusive supervision) supervisors' experiences of coworker relationship con? ict ultimately impact important job outcomes. 2. Abuse as a displaced response to coworker relationship con? ict Abusive supervision is de? ned as prolonged hostile treatment toward subordinates, excluding physical violence (Tepper, 2000). Research indicates that supervisors who perceive that they are victims of interactional or procedural injustice, both of which may be associated with coworker relationship con? ct (Fox, Spector, & Miles, 2001), are relatively more likely than others to abuse their subordinates (Aryee, Chen, Sun, & Debrah, 2007; Tepper, Duffy, Henle, & Lambert, 2006). Tepper, Duffy, Henle, and Lambert (2006) argued that this trickle-down effect, in which supervisors' frustrations are channeled into abusive behaviors targete d at subordinates, may occur because subordinates are a relatively safe target toward which supervisors can vent their frustrations (Tepper, Duffy, Henle, & Lambert, 2006).This argument suggests abusive supervision may be a response to frustrating workplace events such as coworker relationship con? ict. Coworker con? ict has been linked to undesirable emotional states and can negatively impact interpersonal relationships (e. g. , Bergmann & Volkema, 1994; Deutch, 1969). Emotion research suggests that the anger and frustration associated with interpersonal con? ict can promote verbal (e. g. , shouting) and behavioral (e. g. , theft, sabotage, violence) aggression toward those who stimulate the con? ct (e. g. , Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Fox & Spector, 1999; Greenberg, 1990; Spector, 1975). Many of these behaviors, with the exception of physical violence, would fall under Tepper's (2000) de? nition of abusive supervision if aime d at subordinates. Drawing on ? ndings from research on displaced aggression we argue that, due to the relative power of supervisors' coworkers, these relationship con? ict-driven behaviors might, in fact, be targeted at subordinates.Displaced aggression occurs when individuals experience mistreatment from one party and respond by mistreating a second party (Hoobler & Brass, 2006, Miller, Pedersen, Earlywine & Pollock, 2003, Twenge & Campbell, 2003). Several triggers of displaced aggression have been identi? ed, including social rejection (Twenge & Campbell, 2003) and negative feedback (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Hoobler and Brass (2006) also showed that abusive supervision at work can promote displaced aggression toward family members at home. We examine abusive supervision as a form of displaced aggression ather than a predictor, although both conceptualizations are logical. Displaced aggression is often triggered by unpleasant workplace events (e. g. , Miller, Pedersen, Earlywi ne & Pollock, 2003) and abusive supervision ? ts this criteria. We argue that abusive supervision also can ? t the criteria of displaced aggression if it is triggered by events beyond the control of subordinates, such as the abusers' coworker relationship con? ict. Thus, abusive supervision can likely be both a cause of displaced aggression and a type of displaced aggression.Note: Dashed lines represent hypothesized mediated linkages Supervisor-Rated Subordinate Work Effort Supervisor-Rated Coworker Conflict Abusive Supervision Supervisor-Rated Subordinate TaskFocused OCB Moderator: Leader-Member Exchange Fig. 1. Hypothesized model. 1012 K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 As Tepper, Duffy, Henle and Lambert (2006) argued, abusive supervision can be used as a means for venting frustration because subordinates have relatively low levels of retaliatory power and, therefore, serve as a lower-risk target for venting behaviors than do employees in po sitions of greater hierarchical power.Victim precipitation research also supports this logic, indicating that displaced aggression is often targeted at those who are unable or unwilling to defend themselves, as is likely the case among subordinates who can be disciplined and terminated by their supervisors (e. g. , Aquino, 2000). This desire to vent frustration at individuals who are unassociated with the initial con? ict, similar to the anecdotal notion of â€Å"kicking the dog† after a bad day at work, can be understood in the context of displaced aggression. Coworker relationship con? ct is a potent source of stress and frustration (Thomas, 1976, 1992) and, because these are unpleasant, individuals are motivated to engage in coping behaviors that will diminish their presence (Kemper, 1966). These emotion-driven coping behaviors can often take the form of hostile behaviors such as sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright & Schminke, 2002) and verbal assaults (Douglas & Martinko, 2001). Thus, coworker relationship con? ict may trigger aggressive behaviors (e. g. , yelling at others) that serve a coping function. Thomas (1976) noted, however, that the relative power of the parties to a con? ct in? uences the manner in which both parties will respond. When legitimate power levels are equal, as in the case of coworkers, hostile responses are likely to be met with retaliation although it is possible that the target of retaliation will respond with additional hostility, creating an escalating cycle of con? ict. Subordinates, on the other hand, are often reluctant to respond in kind to hostile supervisor behaviors for fear of losing their jobs. The fact that subordinates are not the cause of the supervisor's frustration, that is, the frustration is caused by supervisors' con? ct with their coworkers, may have little impact on the behavioral response if the behavior is largely motivated by emotion as opposed to logic. That is, the desire to vent anger over coworker relat ionship con? ict using a safe target may override concerns that subordinates are not the logical targets for retaliation, given that they are not the cause of the con? ict. Based on these arguments, we predict: Hypothesis 1. Supervisors' reports of coworker relationship con? ict are positively associated with abusive supervisory behaviors, as rated by subordinates. 2. 1. The moderating in? ence of LMX relationship quality Thomas (1976, 1992) argued that a conceptualization process occurs between the con? ict experience and the behavioral outcome in which information is processed and behavioral options are evaluated. Although this cognitive process is likely to incorporate a wide range of information, we argue that an evaluation of relationships with subordinates is particularly relevant when behaviors toward these individuals are concerned. LMX theory suggests that the quality of leader–member relationships varies from high to low (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 19 95).Subordinates in high quality exchanges are seen more favorably and receive advantages from their supervisors that their low quality LMX counterparts do not (e. g. , Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997). As such, members in high quality exchanges receive preferential treatment from supervisors who are motivated to maintain these productive relationships. We expect that supervisors who experience high levels of coworker relationship con? ict may become abusive toward subordinates, but will be selective in choosing which subordinates to target. Abusive supervisory behaviors generally have a negative effect on ictims' levels of motivation and attitudes toward their jobs (e. g. , Duffy, Ganster & Pagon, 2002; Schat, Desmarais, & Kelloway, 2006). Although it can be argued that effective managers would not want to risk these consequences with any employees, LMX theory would suggest that supervisors are especially motivated to maintain effective relationships with their high quality LMX subo rdinates. We argue, therefore, that supervisors who are frustrated by coworker relationship con? ict and who choose to react in an abusive manner will generally choose low quality LMX subordinates as their targets.Put differently, we expect that when con? ict-driven abuse occurs, members in low quality exchanges will experience it more strongly and frequently than members in high quality exchanges. Justice and victim precipitation theories provide additional support for this argument (e. g. , Aquino, 2000; Bies & Moag, 1986). From a justice perspective, instead of perceiving members of low quality LMX relationships as less risky targets for abuse, it can also be argued that supervisors ? nd it easier to justify abuse toward these employees. Members of low quality exchanges are often characterized by relatively low performance levels (e. . , Deluga & Perry, 1994; Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993), and it might be argued that supervisors who use abusive behaviors to cope with relationsh ip con? ict-driven frustration will feel most justi? ed in focusing on these employees. That is, supervisors might rationalize the abuse by convincing themselves that relatively lowperforming subordinates in low quality LMX relationships deserve the abusive behavior. Victim precipitation research also suggests that several characteristics common among low quality LMX subordinates make them likely targets of abuse.Although provocative and threatening behaviors have been linked to retaliatory aggression (e. g. , Aquino & Byron, 2002; Tepper, 2007), more salient to our focus on leader–member relationships is the precipitation research indicating that abusive individuals often target those who are seen as weak or defenseless. Individuals who are hesitant to defend themselves or view themselves or their situations negatively appear to draw the attention of aggressive individuals (Aquino, 2000; Olweus, 1978; Rahim, 1983; Tepper, 2007).As discussed above, the hierarchical nature of their relationship likely promotes the former tendency among subordinates, making them relatively safe targets for abuse. Members in low quality exchanges, in particular, might be unwilling to further jeopardize their relationship with their supervisors by retaliating against abuse and might also internalize their undesirable status, promoting the negative perceptions of their workplace competence and situation (e. g. , Ferris, Brown, & Heller, 2009) that can provoke victimization.Similar to our arguments concerning displaced abuse of subordinates, victim precipitation research suggests that these aggressors might wish to engage in abusive behavior as a means to K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 1013 preserve their social standing and bolster perceptions of their control over a situation (e. g. , Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Felson, 1978). As such, this line of research reinforces the notion that subordinates might be targeted for displac ed abuse and suggests that low quality LMX subordinates are especially likely to be viewed as vulnerable, and therefore relatively safe, targets.Based on these arguments, we predict: Hypothesis 2. The relationship between supervisor-reported coworker relationship con? ict and member-reported abusive supervision is moderated by LMX, such that the positive relationship is stronger when LMX relationship quality is lower. 2. 2. Outcomes of abusive supervision The outcome portion of our conceptual model, shown in Fig. 1, examines the effects of abusive supervisory responses to coworker relationship con? ict on work effort and OCB. While we do not posit that abusive supervision is the only factor mediating the relationships between supervisors' coworker relationship con? ct and these outcomes, we argue that abuse can serve as an explanatory mechanism and explain a relevant amount of variance in each consequence. Abusive supervision is a negative workplace event that, like con? ict, can ha ve negative attitudinal and behavioral consequences (Tepper, 2007; Tepper, Henle, Lambert, Giacalone, & Duffy, 2008; Tepper, Moss, Lockhart, & Carr, 2007). It has been argued that these outcomes are caused by the stress and emotional strain associated with abuse from individuals in a position of power (e. g. Duffy, Ganster & Pagon, 2002; Harvey, Stoner, Hochwarter & Kacmar, 2007; Tepper, 2000). Further, Duffy, Ganster and Pagon (2002) found evidence suggesting that abuse promotes diminished self-ef? cacy. As we discuss in the following sections, each of these consequences of abusive supervision can be logically linked to the outcomes depicted in Fig. 1. 2. 2. 1. Work effort Because abusive supervision can diminish victims' con? dence in their abilities (Duffy, Ganster & Pagon, 2002), it follows that motivation to exert high levels of effort at work will likely decrease in response to abuse.Abusive supervisors, who by de? nition are consistent in their abuse (Tepper, 2000), might eve ntually wear employees down with a steady onslaught of aggressive behavior (e. g. , yelling, criticizing), reducing their con? dence and motivation. Similarly, it may be that over time abusive supervision promotes emotional exhaustion (Harvey, Stoner, Hochwarter & Kacmar, 2007; Tepper, 2000), a condition characterized by diminished emotional and physical coping abilities and closely associated with job burnout (Brewer & Shapard, 2004; Cropanzano, Rupp, & Byrne, 2003).Harvey, Stoner, Hochwarter and Kacmar (2007) argued that this relationship was likely due to the persistent assault on employees' feelings and ef? cacy perceptions (Savicki & Cooley, 1983) associated with abusive supervision. When emotional exhaustion occurs, individuals demonstrate diminished motivation and a reduced ability to handle stressful work events, promoting a reduction in work effort (Brewer & Shapard, 2004; Kahill, 1988; Leiter & Maslach, 1988).Using a different lens to view the abuse–work effort asso ciation, employees might also view abusive supervision as a form of psychological contract breach, as subordinates generally do not expect to be abused by those given the authority to supervise them (Tepper, 2000). When employees perceive that a breach has taken place, they often feel less compelled to ful? ll their obligation to exert high levels of work effort (Harris, Kacmar & Zivnuska, 2007). 2. 2. 2. Citizenship behaviors The ? nal outcome depicted in Fig. 1 concerns the negative in? ence of coworker relationship con? ict-driven abuse and subordinates' propensity to engage in OCB. This predicted relationship is based on research indicating that abusive supervision is associated with factors, including decreased organizational commitment, poor work-related attitudes, and injustice perceptions (Aryee, Chen, Sun & Debrah, 2007; Duffy, Ganster & Pagon, 2002; Schat, Desmarais, & Kelloway, 2006; Zellars, Tepper & Duffy, 2002), that can inhibit citizenship behaviors (Ambrose, Seabrigh t & Schminke, 2002; Zellars, Tepper & Duffy, 2002).Victims of abusive supervision often feel that they have been treated unjustly (Tepper, 2000), a perception that is associated with reduced levels of OCB (Moorman, 1991). As Judge, Scott, and Ilies (2006) argued, unjust treatment is likely to qualify as a negative affective event and can therefore provoke a retaliatory behavioral response. One such response could logically be the withholding of citizenship behaviors, which are not a requirement of the job and could run counter to the goal of retaliation by making the supervisor's job easier (e. g. , Zellars, Tepper & Duffy, 2002).In support of this reasoning, additional research indicates that abusive supervision motivates retaliatory behaviors such as workplace deviance and aggression that run contrary to the notion of citizenship behavior (Dupre, Inness, Connelly, Barling, & Hoption, 2006; Schaubhut, Adams, & Jex, 2004). Based on these arguments, we predict: Hypothesis 3. Abusive supervision is negatively related to supervisor reports of subordinate work effort and organizational citizenship behaviors. 2. 3. The mediating role of abusive supervision We have argued that relationship con? ct between supervisors and their coworkers is associated with abusive supervisory behaviors, and that such behaviors have negative implications for victims' levels of work effort and OCB. Implicit in this line of reasoning is the notion that coworker relationship con? ict at the supervisor level is ultimately associated with decreased levels of 1014 K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 effort and OCB at the subordinate level, and that abusive supervision acts a mediator between these variables. More speci? ally, the negative effects of supervisors' relationship con? ict with their coworkers are predicted to manifest themselves in the form of abusive behaviors that negatively affect employees' attitudes and behaviors, promoting negative sub ordinate outcomes. Thus, while a relationship between a supervisor's level of coworker relationship con? ict and subordinates' levels of effort and OCB may seem somewhat abstract, we suggest that coworker relationship con? ict-driven abusive supervision provides an intermediary link between these variables.Based on these arguments, we predict: Hypothesis 4. Abusive supervision mediates the negative relationships between supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict and work effort and organizational citizenship behaviors. 3. Method 3. 1. Samples and procedures The samples utilized in this study were from two different divisions of a state government. The division in Sample 1 was responsible for handling disease related issues (e. g. , STDs, immunizations, tuberculosis), whereas the division in Sample 2 handled environmental health related issues (e. g. , radiation, clean water).To begin the data collection efforts, the director of each division sent an email to all employees in th eir branch. The email informed the potential respondents of the study's purpose, that participation was voluntary, and that the results would be con? dential. After this email, the researchers sent a personalized message again explaining the goal of the survey, the con? dentiality of responses, and a web link to the survey. Respondents were asked to complete the survey during the next month. Respondents were required to provide their supervisor's name to match supervisor–subordinate responses.At the same time, supervisors were asked to provide ratings on each of their direct reports. In Sample 1, eliminating responses with missing data or those that were unable to be matched (i. e. , we received a subordinate response, but not a matching supervisor response) resulted in a sample size of 121 (58% response rate). Subordinates were 68% female, the average age was 41. 68 years, the average job tenure was 3. 38 years, and their average organizational tenure was 5. 22 years. In tot al, 28 supervisors provided ratings, resulting in an average of 4. 32 ratings per supervisor.For the supervisors, the demographic breakdown was 57% female, the average age was 47. 91 years, the average job tenure was 4. 79 years, and their average organizational tenure was 7. 73 years. After the elimination of unusable responses in Sample 2, our usable sample size was 134 (64% response rate). Participants in Sample 2 were 60% male, had an average age of 46. 04 years, average job tenure of 7. 04 years, and average organizational tenure of 11. 51 years. Forty-four supervisors provided ratings, which resulted in an average of 3. 05 ratings per supervisor.The demographic breakdown for the supervisors was 75% male, an average age of 49. 29 years, average job tenure of 9. 64 years, and average organizational tenure of 16. 26 years. 3. 2. Measures Unless otherwise noted, a 5-point Likert scale (anchors: â€Å"strongly disagree† (1) to â€Å"strongly agree† (5)) was used for a ll survey items. Scales were coded with high values representing high levels of the constructs. 3. 3. Subordinate measures 3. 3. 1. Abusive supervision In both samples abusive supervision was measured with six items from Tepper's (2000) measure.We were unable to use the full 15-item measure due to management concerns about the survey's overall length. Thus, we had experts in the area look at the content of each of the items, and we chose 6 items that best captured the full range of abusive supervisory behaviors. The items we chose were â€Å"My supervisor makes negative comments about me to others,† â€Å"My supervisor gives me the silent treatment,† â€Å"My supervisor expresses anger at me when he/she is mad for another reason,† â€Å"My supervisor is rude to me,† â€Å"My supervisor breaks promises he/she makes,† and â€Å"My supervisor puts me down in front of others. In an effort to establish the validity of our shortened scale, we compared o ur reduced scale to the full measure using the data from the Tepper (2000) article. 1 We found that the full 15-item scale was correlated with our 6-item scale at . 96. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was . 90 for Sample 1 and . 92 for Sample 2. 3. 3. 2. Leader–member exchange We used Liden and Maslyn's (1998) 12-item leader–member exchange multidimensional scale to measure exchange quality in both samples. A sample item included â€Å"My supervisor would defend me to others in the organization if I made an honest mistake. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was . 94 for Sample 1 and . 92 for Sample 2. 1 We thank Ben Tepper for allowing us to use his original data for this correlation. K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 1015 3. 4. Supervisor measures 3. 4. 1. Coworker relationship con? ict In both samples supervisors rated their relationship con? icts with their coworkers using the 4-item Jehn (1995) scale. A sample item included à ¢â‚¬Å"Is there tension among your coworkers? † These questions were included in a section of the survey here the supervisors were answering questions about their attitudes, behaviors, and relationships with their coworkers. This section was separate from the section where supervisors commented on their subordinates, thus making it clear that these relationship con? ict questions were focused on coworkers at their level in the organization (e. g. , managers' relationship con? icts with other managers). The response scale for this construct was â€Å"Not at all (1)† to â€Å"To a very great extent (5)†. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was . 95 for Sample 1 and . 94 for Sample 2. 3. 4. 2.Work effort In both samples supervisors rated subordinates' work effort using Brown and Leigh's (1996) 5-item scale. A sample item was â€Å"When there's a job to be done, this subordinate devotes all his/her energy to getting it done. † The Cronbach alpha for the scale was . 93 for Sample 1 and . 94 for Sample 2. 3. 4. 3. Organizational citizenship behaviors Supervisors responded to Settoon and Mossholder's (2002) 6-item scale to measure subordinate task-focused OCB in both samples. A sample item was â€Å"This subordinate assists coworkers with heavy work loads even though it is not part of the job. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was . 84 for Sample 1 and . 81 for Sample 2. 3. 5. Control variables We controlled for four variables, all measured from the subordinate, in an effort to minimize potentially spurious relationships. The variables we controlled for were age (measured in years), job tenure (measured in months), organizational tenure (measured in months), and supervisor–subordinate relationship tenure (measured in months). 3. 6. Analytical approach In both samples in this study, supervisors' coworker relationship con? ict responses were used as predictors of subordinate outcomes (i. . , cross-level main effect). Thus, a single supervi sor coworker relationship con? ict rating was used as the predictor variable for multiple subordinates. As a result, for these variables there was no within-supervisor variance and all of the variance was between supervisors (i. e. , ICCs were 1. 00). Additionally, supervisors provided ratings on certain scales (e. g. , work effort and OCB) for multiple subordinates, thus resulting in a supervisor effect (e. g. , ICC1s for OCB of . 11 in sample 1 and . 13 and sample 2, and ICC2s of . 48 in sample 1 and . 51 in sample 2).To account for the supervisor-level effect in our data, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM: Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004) with grand-mean centering was used to carry out our analyses. In the HLM analyses involving supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict, this variable was included as a Level 2 variable (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong & Congdon, 2004). To test Hypotheses 1–2, there were four steps. In the ? rst step, we entered the four control va riables. In the second step we entered the Level 2 variable of supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict, and it was here that we tested Hypothesis 1.In the third step, we entered the Level 1 moderator variable, LMX. In the fourth step, we entered the cross-level interaction term formed between supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict and LMX. It was in this step that we tested Hypothesis 2. To test the abusive supervision-outcome and mediation hypotheses (3 and 4), we conducted Baron and Kenny's (1986) threestep procedure. The HLM equations are available from the ? rst author request. 4. Results The means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix for the variables in this study are provided in Table 1 for Sample 1 and Table 2 for Sample 2.In both samples abusive supervision was signi? cantly correlated with supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict, as well as our dependent variables. Given that a few of the correlations between our focal variables were h igh, we elected to run a series of con? rmatory factor analyses (CFA) on the scales used in our study to ensure that they were independent and that the items produced the expected factor structures. These analyses were run on both samples separately. To conduct our CFAs, we used LISREL 8. 80, a covariance matrix as input, and a maximum-likelihood estimation.We elected to conduct our CFA analyses using composite indicators rather than items due to the large number of items and our moderate sample sizes. To create our composite indicators, we assigned items based on factor loadings from an exploratory factor analysis (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994; Eddleston, Viega, & Powell, 2006). Speci? cally, for our four-item scales we combined the two items with the highest and lowest factor loadings to the ? rst indicator and the remaining two items to the second indicator. For the ? ve-item scales we created the ? st indicator as described above and included the remaining three items on the secon d indicator. For our six-item scale we paired the highest and lowest loading item to create the ? rst indicator and then repeated this process for the remaining two indicators. Finally, for the LMX scale we used the four subscales (loyalty, contribution, professional respect, and affect) as composite indicators. Our approach resulted in 15 indicators for our 6 scales. 1016 K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among study variables in Sample 1.Variable 1. Abusive supervision 2. Sup. coworker con? ict 3. Leader–member exchange (LMX) 4. Work effort 5. OCB 6. LMX affect 7. LMX contribution 8. LMX loyalty 9. LMX professional respect 10. Age 11. Job tenure 12. Organizational tenure 13. Relationship tenure Mean 1. 31 3. 03 3. 92 4. 03 3. 87 3. 86 4. 10 3. 69 4. 03 41. 68 3. 38 5. 22 1. 99 SD . 57 1. 02 . 77 . 79 . 72 . 97 . 68 . 84 1. 09 11. 1 3. 88 5. 23 2. 02 1 . 77 . 21? ? . 67 ? . 27 ? . 29 .60 .36 .69 .62 .10 . 10 . 05 . 25 2 . 95 ? .11 ? .20? ? . 18? ? . 05 . 04 . 19? ? . 14 . 01 . 23? .01 . 17 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 .76 . 3 .35 .91 .77 .83 .90 ? . 00 . 05 . 08 ? .00 .86 . 40 .28 .22? .35 .28 .03 ? .00 . 10 . 00 .65 . 27 .22? .33 .35 .01 ? .03 . 05 . 12 .92 . 62 .68 .79 ? . 02 . 11 . 11 . 04 .75 . 56 .58 .11 . 05 . 11 . 04 .74 . 64 ? . 04 ? .01 . 05 ? .11 .94 ? .03 . 02 . 01 . 02 – . 35 .39 .26 – . 69 .48 – . 49 Note: Values in italics on the diagonal are the square root of the average variance explained which must be larger than all zero-order correlations in the row and column in which they appear to demonstrate discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).N = 121. ? p b . 05. p b . 01. We began by estimating a six-factor solution, with each factor representing a scale in our study. Fit indices, shown in Table 3, indicate that the six-factor model ? t the data. To verify that the six-factor structure was the best representation of our data, we estimated three alternative models and compared them to our baseline model via chi-square difference tests. The alternative models estimated included two ? ve-factor models and a unidimensional model. The alternative models were created by combining scales that had strong correlations to form a larger factor.The ? rst alternative model combined abusive supervision and LMX into one factor while the second combined OCB and work effort. A description of each alternative model and the CFA results are offered in Table 3. As shown in Table 3, the chi-square difference test results support the six-factor structure as originally designed. To further explore the discriminant validity of our scales we followed the procedure outlined by Fornell and Larcker (1981) and calculated the square root of the average variance explained for each of the scales in our study.This value, which we present on the diagonal in Tables 1 and 2, represents the variance accounted for by the items that com pose the scale. To demonstrate discriminant validity, this value must exceed the corresponding latent variable correlations in the same row and column. If this condition is met, then we have evidence that the variance shared between any two constructs is less than the average variance explained by the items that compose the scale (i. e. , discriminant validity). As shown in Tables 1 and 2, this condition is met for all of the scales used in our study.The HLM results predicting abusive supervision are shown in Tables 4 (for Sample 1) and 5 (for Sample 2) and the HLM results investigating abusive supervision as a mediator and/or predictor are provided in Tables 6 and 7. First describing our interaction results in Table 4, step 1 reveals that relationship tenure (? = . 08, p b . 05) was the only control variable signi? cantly associated with abusive supervision. Step 2 shows that supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict are positively and signi? cantly related to abusive su pervision (? = . 09, p b . 05).This result provides support for Hypothesis 1 in Sample 1. Step 3 in this analysis shows that LMX was negatively associated with abusive supervision (? = ?. 48, p b . 01). Finally, step 4 shows that the interaction term between supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict and LMX was negatively and signi? cantly related to abusive Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among study variables in Sample 2. Variable 1. Abusive supervision 2. Sup. coworker con? ict 3. LMX12 (overall) 4. Work effort 5. OCB 6. LMX affect 7. LMX contribution 8. LMX loyalty 9.LMX professional respect 10. Age 11. Job tenure 12. Organizational tenure 13. Relationship tenure Mean 1. 32 2. 42 4. 04 4. 31 4. 31 4. 04 4. 15 3. 78 4. 19 45. 86 6. 55 11. 16 6. 08 SD . 58 . 76 . 60 . 73 . 67 . 78 . 56 . 78 . 95 6. 89 2. 66 4. 37 2. 12 1 . 92 . 15? ? . 55 ? . 26 ? . 21? ? . 53 .05 ? .52 ? . 57 .04 . 02 . 01 ? .01 2 . 94 ? .04 ? .03 ? .19? ? . 03 ? .06 ? .02 ? . 02 ? .15 ? .09 ? .07 . 00 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 .92 . 09 . 05 . 84 .53 .83 .86 ? . 07 . 08 . 05 . 07 .87 . 72 ? . 01 ? .03 . 18? .11 ? .03 ? .00 . 03 ? .02 .85 . 01 ? .13 . 09 . 13 ? .13 . 1 ? .05 . 07 .88 . 28 .56 .69 ? . 10 . 05 ? .03 . 00 .71 . 38 .22? .08 . 16* . 18? .15 .84 . 59 ? . 08 . 03 . 03 . 01 .95 ? .06 . 04 . 01 . 08 – . 14 . 23 .18? – . 61 .27 – . 26 Note: Values in italics on the diagonal are the square root of the average variance explained which must be larger than all zero-order correlations in the row and column in which they appear to demonstrate discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). N = 134. ? p b . 05. p b . 01. K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 Table 3 Alternative model test results.Model Sample 1 (N = 121) Baseline 6-factor model 5-factor combining abuse and LMX 5-factor combining work effort and OCB 1-factor Sample 2 (N = 134) Baseline 6-factor model 5-factor combining abuse and LMX 5- factor combining work effort and OCB 1-factor X2 102 196 127 706 df 75 80 80 90 X2diff dfdiff CFI . 98 . 95 . 97 . 59 NFI . 95 . 91 . 94 . 57 1017 RMSEA . 048 . 093 . 059 . 200 94 25 604 5 5 15 112 276 224 1177 75 80 80 90 164 112 1065 5 5 15 .98 . 93 . 93 . 47 .94 . 89 . 89 . 46 .056 . 125 . 107 . 280 Note: Abuse = abusive supervision, LMX = leader–member exchange, OCB = organizational citizenship behaviors. p b . 001. supervision (? = ?. 12, p b . 01). Overall, the results in Table 5 (Sample 2) are similar. In step 1 none of the control variables were signi? cantly associated with the outcome, but in step 2, supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict were positively and signi? cantly related to abusive supervision (? = . 11, p b . 05), again supporting Hypothesis 1. Step 3 in Table 5 shows that LMX was negatively associated with abusive supervision (? = ?. 54, p b . 01). In the ? nal step, the supervisor reported coworker relationship con? ict ? LMX interaction t erm was negatively and signi? antly related to abusive supervision (? = ? .29, p b . 05). To determine support for our interaction hypothesis, we graphed the two signi? cant moderating effects. We did so by plotting two slopes, one at one standard deviation below and one at one standard deviation above the mean (Stone & Hollenbeck, 1989). Figs. 2 (for Sample 1) and 3 (for Sample 2) illustrate the signi? cant interactions and show that the positive relationships between supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict and abusive supervision were stronger when LMX relationship quality was lower.Additionally, we calculated simple slopes for each of our interactions. In sample 1, we found that the slope of the low LMX line was signi? cant (t = 2. 00, p b . 05), whereas the slope of the high LMX line was not signi? cant. Similar to sample 1, in sample 2 the slope of the low LMX was signi? cant (t = 2. 11, p b . 05), but the slope of the high LMX line was not signi? cant. In total, t hese results provide support for Hypothesis 2 in both samples. Tables 6 and 7 provide the results of our mediation analyses. First discussing the results from Sample 1 shown in Table 6, supervisor-reported coworker relationship con? ct was signi? cantly related to abusive supervision (? = . 09, p b . 05) (which ful? lls one of Baron and Kenny's (1986) mediation requirements) and to OCB (? = ? .08, p b . 10) and work effort (? = ?. 14, p b . 05) (ful? lling another mediation requirement). Steps 2c and 3c show that when both supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict and abusive supervision are entered into the equation, the coworker relationship con? ict variable is no longer signi? cant. In particular, the gammas for supervisor-reported coworker relationship con? ict predicting OCB dropped from ?. 08 to ?. 6 and for predicting work effort dropped from ?. 14 to ? .11. However, abusive supervision is signi? cantly and positively related to OCB (? = ?. 37, p b . 01) and signi ? cantly and negatively related to work effort (? = ?. 27, p b . 05). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported in Sample 1. In terms of the mediation results, the results from Baron and Kenny's (1986) three-step procedure show that abusive supervision fully mediated the relationship between supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict and OCB and partially mediated the relationship with work effort. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported in Sample 1.Table 4 Hierarchical linear modeling results predicting abusive supervision in Sample 1. Step 1 Control variables: Age Job tenure Organizational tenure Relationship tenure Independent variable Sup-rated coworker con? ict (A) Moderator: LMX (B) Interaction term: A? B ? R2 . 00 . 00 ? .01 . 08? Step 2 . 00 ? .00 ? .01 . 07 . 09? Step 3 . 00 . 00 ? .00 . 07? .05? ? . 48 Step 4 . 00 ? .00 ? .00 . 06? .05 ? .46 ? . 12 .02 .02 .02 .45 Note: Sup-rated coworker con? ict = supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict, LMX = leader–member exchange. N = 121. ? p b . 05. p b . 01. 018 K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 Table 5 Hierarchical linear modeling results predicting abusive supervision in Sample 2. Step 1 Control variables: Age Job tenure Organizational tenure Relationship tenure Independent variable Sup-rated coworker con? ict (A) Moderator: LMX (B) Interaction term: A? B ? R2 . 00 . 00 ? .00 ? .00 Step 2 . 01 .00 ? .00 ? .00 . 11? Step 3 ? .00 . 00 ? .00 . 00 . 09? ? . 54 Step 4 . 00 . 00 ? .00 . 00 . 13? ? . 55 ? . 29 .05 .01 .01 .35 Note: Sup-rated coworker con? ict = supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ct, LMX = leader–member exchange. N = 134. ? p b . 05. p b . 01. Next we turn to the HLM results presented for Sample 2 in Table 7. This table shows that supervisor-reported coworker relationship con? ict was signi? cantly related to abusive supervision in step 1b (which passes Baron and Kenny's (1986) ? rst step) and OCB (in step 2b), but not work effort (in ste p 3b). These results pass the ? rst two steps for mediation for OCB, but not work effort. Table 7 also reveals that abusive supervision is negatively and signi? cantly related to OCB (? = ?. 26, p b . 05) in step 2c, and signi? antly and negatively related to work effort (? = ?. 39, p b . 01) in step 3c. Thus, Hypothesis 3, which was supported in Sample 1, is also supported in Sample 2. Step 2c shows that when both supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict and abusive supervision are entered into the equation, the coworker relationship con? ict variable is no longer a signi? cant predictor of OCB. In terms of the mediation results, the results from Baron and Kenny's (1986) three-step procedure show that abusive supervision mediated the relationship between supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ct and OCB, but not work effort. Thus, Hypothesis 4, which was supported for both dependent variables in Sample 1, was only supported for OCB in Sample 2. 5. Discussion The pu rpose of this study was to further our knowledge of the predictors and outcomes of abusive supervision. We pursued this goal by examining supervisor reports of relationship con? ict with their coworkers as a predictor of subordinate-rated abusive supervision, and LMX quality as a situational variable in? uencing this relationship. Additionally, we examined the outcomes of supervisor-rated OCB nd work effort and found that abusive supervision fully mediated the relationships between supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict and OCB in both samples and the outcomes of work effort in one sample. Returning to our theoretical arguments, we found that displaced aggression and LMX theories provide useful lenses for discussing predictors and outcomes of abusive supervision. Coworker relationship con? ict at any level is a potent source of stress and frustration as it impedes the achievement of goals and the attainment of desired outcomes (e. g. , Thomas, 1976).Like past abusive s upervision research (Tepper, Duffy, Henle & Lambert, 2006), our results suggest that some supervisors will resort to abusive behaviors against their employees as a means of coping with these consequences. This study advances existing research by explicitly examining situations where subordinates are not the logical target of retaliation (i. e. , they are not the source of the con? ict). Because subordinates are an easy and accessible target, however, having less power and less of an ability to retaliate, they make relatively safe candidates for abuse from frustrated supervisors.Table 6 Hierarchical linear modeling mediation results in Sample 1. DV = abusive supervision Step 1a Age Job tenure Organizational tenure Relationship tenure Supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict Abusive supervision Note: OCB = organizational citizenship behaviors. N = 121. ? p b . 05. p b . 01. .00 . 00 ? .01 . 08? Step 1b . 00 ? .00 ? .01 . 07 . 09? Step 2a . 00 ? .02 . 00 . 05 DV = OCB DV = work effort Step 2b . 00 ? .01 ? .00 . 05 ? .08+ Step 2c . 00 ? .01 ? .00 . 07 ? .06 ? .27? Step 3a ? .00 ? .02 . 02 . 00 Step 2b ? .00 ? .01 . 02 . 01 ? .14? Step 3c . 0 ? .01 . 01 . 04 . 11 ? .37 K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 Table 7 Hierarchical linear modeling mediation results in Sample 2. DV = abusive supervision Step 1a Age Job tenure Organizational tenure Relationship tenure Supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict Abusive supervision Note: OCB = organizational citizenship behaviors. N = 134. ? p b . 05. p b . 01. .00 . 00 ? .00 ? .00 Step 1b . 01 . 00 ? .00 ? .00 . 11? Step 2a ? .01 ? .00 . 00 . 00 DV = OCB DV = work effort 1019 Step 2b ? .01 ? .00 . 00 . 00 ? .13? Step 2c ? .01 . 0 ? .00 . 00 ? .09 ? .26? Step 3a ? .00 ? .00 . 00 ? .00 Step 3b ? .00 ? .00 . 00 ? .00 ? .03 Step 3c . 00 ? .00 . 00 ? .00 . 02 ? .39 Additionally, when supervisors experience coworker relationship con? ict, our results indicate that they are most l ikely to abuse subordinates with whom they have low quality LMX relationships. This ? nding appears to support our argument that supervisors will focus their abusive behaviors on those employees in low quality exchanges in order to shield their high quality relationships from the detrimental effects of abusive supervision.In this way, supervisors may reason that abusive behaviors allow them to vent frustration while minimizing the negative in? uence of this coping behavior on their most valued employees. Naturally, there are ? aws in this method of coping, most notably that the performance levels of abused employees will likely suffer, causing added strain and frustration for other employees and the supervisors themselves. Among supervisors who make the problematic choice to cope through abuse, however, it appears that employees in low-quality relationships are the most likely targets.We also extended abusive supervision research with our ? ndings indicating that this variable is re lated to the outcomes of OCB and work effort. These ? ndings are noteworthy as they extend the nomological network of outcomes related to abusive supervision, and because both outcomes were supervisor-rated, which helps to minimize common source bias concerns (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Additionally, in sample 1 we found that abusive supervision served as an intermediary mechanism explaining the relationships between supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ct and both consequences examined, and that there was also mediation on the outcome of OCB in sample 2. These results are important as they begin to answer the questions related to how situational supervisor variables, such as coworker relationship con? ict, ultimately are translated into subordinate outcomes. Surprisingly, we did not ? nd support for the work effort mediation hypothesis in Sample 2. A post hoc explanation for these insigni? cant ? ndings may relate to the demographic composition of th e samples. Sample 2 was different from Sample 1 for both subordinates and supervisors.It was primarily male, the average age was higher, and average job and organizational tenure were both more than double (except for supervisor job tenure) those in the ? rst sample. Although it is possible to deduce explanations as to how these differences might have in? uenced our results, such atheoretical logic would be overly speculative. Thus, as we suggest below, we encourage replicative research in additional samples that would allow for a more systematic assessment of these, or other, sample-speci? c characteristics. 5. 1. Contributions These ? dings make several contributions to the extant research on abusive supervision and LMX relationships. First, they build support for the notion of displaced abusive supervision and undermine a potential alternative explanation. In Tepper's (2007) review of abusive supervision literature, he concluded that supervisors' perceptions of organization-level factors, such as Fig. 2. Moderating effect of LMX on the relationship between supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict and abusive supervision in Sample 1. 1020 K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023Fig. 3. Moderating effect of LMX on the relationship between supervisor-rated coworker relationship con? ict and abusive supervision in Sample 2. injustice and contract violation, can trigger abuse toward individual targets (i. e. , subordinates). He argued that this phenomenon might be explained by displaced aggression logic, in that subordinates serve as safe abuse targets even if the abuse is unlikely to resolve the perceptions triggering the desire to be abusive. An alternative, although somewhat tenuous, explanation is that these negative perceptions in? ence animosity toward the overall organization and that supervisors justify the abuse of subordinates who are seen as complicit in the perceived negative aspects of the organization. Our ? ndings suggest that this alternative basis of justi? cation would not adequately explain displaced abusive supervision. Looking beyond generalized organizational perceptions, we found that even frustration stemming from speci? c, identi? able non-subordinate sources (i. e. , supervisors' coworkers) might translate into abuse toward subordinates.This suggests that abusive supervision may serve as a â€Å"self-defeating† coping mechanism (e. g. , Baumeister & Scher, 1988), akin to mechanisms such as problem drinking and procrastination, in that it seeks short-term stress-reduction (e. g. , through emotional venting) in a harmful way that does not address the true source of the underlying problem (e. g. , con? ict with peers). We also expand on Tepper's conclusion, again stemming from his 2007 review of abusive supervision research, that subordinate characteristics in? uence the likelihood that they will experience abuse.As in the present study, Tepper (2007) cited victimization research to argue that subordinates who appear overly provocative or passive put themselves at a heightened risk for abuse. Expanding on the latter idea, we argued and observed that employees in low quality LMX relationships, who we expect demonstrate relatively high levels of passivity and vulnerability, report higher levels of abuse. This suggests that instead of identifying each of the potential subordinate characteristics that can incite abuse, a more parsimonious approach might be to look at broad relationship variables such as LMX that can be viewed as re? cting the aggregate impact of these individual characteristics. This conclusion also adds to LMX research by revealing an additional consequence of low-quality LMX relationships. In addition to the wide body of research showing that low-quality LMX subordinates experience outcomes such as fewer rewards, lower resource levels, and reduced job satisfaction (e. g. , Liden, Sparrowe & Wayne, 1997), this study suggests a more se rious potential consequence in the form of victimization by abusive supervisors.Additionally, our results, and the fact that most were replicated across the two samples, demonstrate the utility of multi-level models for predicting employee consequences of abusive supervision. Abusive supervision is an inherently multi-level phenomenon and this study shows that insights into some causes of abuse, such as con? ict levels between supervisors, exist that cannot be assessed from subordinate self-reports. Similarly, it identi? es supervisor-rated subordinate outcomes of abusive supervision (effort levels and OCB) that are dif? cult to assess with self-reports due to social desirability and common source bias concerns.Further, these supervisor-rated effects provide some indication that abusive supervisors are at least indirectly aware of the selfdefeating consequences of abuse. Our data do not tell us whether supervisors consciously related their abuse to lower levels of employee effort an d citizenship behavior. Their awareness of lower levels among the abused subordinates, however, suggests that a degree of denial would be necessary for the supervisors to overlook these cause–effect relationships. Although existing research has not, to our knowledge, explicitly stated that supervisors are unaware of the consequences of abusive behavior, this ? ding suggests that future research on preventing abuse might bene? t from focusing not on why supervisors view the behavior as acceptable, but why they engage in it despite an apparent awareness of these consequences. 5. 2. Limitations In addition to the aforementioned strengths and contributions, there are limitations that we must acknowledge to properly interpret the study's results. First we acknowledge that the theoretical framework we have developed is not the only logical explanation for the hypothesized and observed relationships.For example, it is plausible that the link between supervisors' coworker relationshi p con? ict and abusive supervision is less cognitive than we have argued. Instead of selectively choosing subordinates as a low-risk target for venting frustration, it might be that some supervisors simply possess traits that predispose K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 1021 them toward con? ict and abusive behaviors (with higher levels of abuse directed at low quality members). Examples of such traits might include negative affectivity or hostile attribution styles (Douglas & Martinko, 2001).An investigation of these possibilities would be useful in forming a more comprehensive understanding of the empirical relationships observed in the present study. In terms of methodological limitations, survey length constraints required us to use a reduced version of the abusive supervision scale. Even though we chose items that tapped into the full set of behaviors and found an extremely high correlation between our shortened measure and the full scale , this may still be viewed as a limitation. Another limitation is that we were unable to measure causality.Thus, there is the potential that our relationships actually have reverse causality or that variables predict each other in a recursive manner. This is particularly true regarding the association between LMX perceptions and abusive supervision. Our results suggest that supervisors are more abusive toward some employees than others and that this difference is associated with variations in subordinates' LMX scores. It can be argued, and is indeed very likely, that an abused employee would report lower LMX scores because of the abuse.The ? nding that supervisors are selective in their abuse targets suggests that some criterion is evaluated before targets are chosen and we have argued that preexisting LMX relationship qualities could serve as this criterion. Our design does not allow us to make this claim de? nitively, however. Similarly, it may be that abusive supervision is not t he predictor of work effort, but that insuf? cient effort by subordinates promotes higher levels of abusive supervision or that both variables in? uence each other in a cyclical manner.We are particularly sensitive to the argument that there may be a feedback loop between abusive supervision and the outcome variables, such that abuse reduces subordinates' effort and citizenship levels, and this reduction provokes further abuse, although the design of the study did not allow us to test this possibility. Along a similar line, it could be that abusive supervision toward subordinates is actually the cause of the supervisors' con? ict among peers. We hope that future studies will be designed to better answer these causality questions.There are also limitations associated with the sampling of public, white-collar organizations. Different organizations (e. g. , private, military, blue-collar) have different rules and norms governing behavior and it is likely that the abusive supervisory be haviors studied would be more or less permissible, and therefore more or less common, in different organizational settings. 5. 3. Directions for future research This study's ? ndings suggest a number of directions for future research. First, we hope future researchers will examine our hypotheses in other, more diverse samples.Although we examined two separate organizations, it is necessary to examine additional samples to better establish the generalizability or boundary conditions of our relationships. A second suggestion is to examine the relationships in this study with a longitudinal research design. The extant research on abusive supervision, including this study, has primarily relied on cross-sectional designs. Although telling, these studies leave out situations and behaviors that impact subordinates over time. In the case of both supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ct and abusive supervision, it may be that supervisors and subordinates learn to cope with these s ituations, and become accustomed to them. Conversely, it could be that these situations and behaviors become worse as they accumulate over time (Harris, Kacmar, & Witt, 2005) as argued by Tepper (2000) and as noted in our discussion of cyclical relationships between abuse and behavioral outcomes in the previous section. Another avenue for future research is to conduct additional multi-level investigations to determine how supervisor experiences and situations impact their subordinates.In this study we examined supervisor reports of coworker relationship con? ict, but it also would be interesting to investigate the effect of supervisors' supervisor relationship con? ict, abusive supervision, LMX, team member exchange, and perceived organizational support (Erdogan & Enders, 2007; Tangirala, Green, & Ramanujam, 2007) as these variables are likely to have â€Å"trickle-down† effects on employee outcomes. Additionally, the aforementioned implication that supervisors might be aware of the consequences of abusive supervision suggests that a multilevel, or at least supervisor-level, focus on understanding the justi? ation process might provide insight into interventions for preventing such behavior. It would also be interesting to investigate personality characteristics, such as Machiavellianism, entitlement, and narcissism, of supervisors and subordinates and how these variables are related to abuse (Harvey & Harris, 2010; Kiazad, Restubog, Zagenczyk, Kiewitz, & Tang, 2010). Finally, we examined LMX from the perspective of the member, but it would be insightful to investigate leader reports of the LMX quality with their subordinates and how this rating interacts with supervisor coworker con? ict. 5. 4. Practical implications Before discussing speci? practical implications from this study, it should be noted that the overarching implication from this and most of the existing body of research on abusive supervision is that abusive supervision is detrimental to a ll parties. It is stressful for victims and hurts organizational performance and a supervisor's effectiveness by negatively affecting desirable outcomes (see Tepper, 2007) such as increased levels of effort and OCB. Employees may feel intimidated and afraid to report the behavior of abusive supervisors, however, making it dif? cult for organizational leaders to identify and eliminate these abusive managers.Because of the dif? culty in reducing existing levels of abuse, preventative techniques for reducing the likelihood of abusive supervision are advisable. The results of this study suggest that one such technique is for organizational leaders to observe and mediate con? icts between supervisory employees, thereby removing an antecedent of abusive behaviors. Additionally, because the supervisors in our study were more likely to abuse employees with whom they shared low-quality relationships, an organization-wide focus on the development of strong leader–member relationships m ight foster a climate where there are few 022 K. J. Harris et al. / The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1010–1023 desirable targets for abuse. We acknowledge that neither of these suggestions (i. e. , mediating supervisor con? icts and promoting strong leader–member relationships) are simple tasks. We suggest, however, that a continuous focus on these goals would consume far less time and energy than dealing with the consequences of abusive supervision. 6